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The Downfall of Grease Hazard Technicians and 
Products Delivery Specialists or "Why French Fry 
Cooks and Pizza Delivery Guys Should Not Pad Their 
Resumes": Scrutinizing Crawford Rehabilitation 
Services, Inc. v. Weissman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Regardless of the form resume fraud assumes, it is usually detri-
mental to the employer and beneficial to the employee. Those who have 
engaged in this form of creative expression feel that they need to em-
bellish their resumes in order to have a chance of being hired. There-
fore, many of those who practice resume padding take liberties with job 
titles, previous duties, and past experiences. 
Recently, case law has developed which is detrimental to those who 
rewrite the history of their lives. In fact, precedent exists that allows 
employers to use misstatements made by employees on resumes and 
applications to shield the employers from claims of wrongful discharge. 
Courts also allow employers to use misdeeds committed on the job dis-
covered after the termination of the employee as a further defense to 
wrongful discharge. Courts call this evidence, discovered by employers 
after an employee files a lawsuit, after-acquired evidence.' 
This Note will first discuss the splintered and varied ways that cir-
cuit courts have dealt with after-acquired evidence. Followed by a dis-
cussion of McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 2 a U.S. Su-
preme Court case that streamlined the application of the after-acquired 
evidence rule by allowing certain damages when public policy concerns 
are present. Finally, this Note will dissect the Colorado Supreme 
Court's holding in Crawford Rehabilitation Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 3 
and examine how this case has further added to the confusion of the 
after-acquired evidence rule. More specifically, this note will analyze 
Copyright~ 1999 by Hoang Huynh. 
1. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 547. 
2. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995). 
3. 938 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1997). 
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how the Colorado Supreme Court erred by deviating from the after-
aquired rule in McKennon. 4 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS IN 
AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE SITUATIONS 
A. The Varied Opinions of the Circuit Courts 
Historically, circuit courts were split regarding their treatment of 
after-acquired evidence as it applied to employees' rights against their 
employers. The Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts, in 
particular, addressed how after -acquired evidence was to be applied. 5 
The conflict did not come from the use of after-acquired evidence be-
cause all the courts allowed the evidence to be admitted. The discrep-
ancy between the courts' decisions arose out of their varied applications 
of the after-acquired evidence. Some courts allowed the detrimental 
evidence to extinguish the entire claim, while others limited the use of 
the evidence to eliminate employee remedies of reinstatement and front 
pay.6 
The Sixth Circuit's analysis determined that the application of after-
acquired evidence absolved the employer of any claims against it, if the 
employee made material misrepresentations or omissions on their re-
sume or application.7 The court outlined two requirements before this 
rule would apply. 8 First, the intentional misstatements must relate to a 
factor the employer used in deciding whether to hire the employee. 9 
Second, the employer must have actually relied on those misstate-
ments.10 The court established these requirements as a safeguard against 
employers freeing themselves from wrongful discharge claims by 
"combing a discharged employee's record for evidence of any and all 
misrepresentations, no matter how minor or trivial." 11 In doing this, the 
Sixth Circuit used a method that resembled promissory estoppel. Thus, 
the employer could not defend a claim of wrongful discharge unless it 
4. Id. 
5. See Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F.Supp. 314, 318 (D. N.J. 1993). 
6. See id. 
7. Id. at 320 (citing Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 
1992)). 
8. See Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 319-20 (quoting Johnson, 955 F.2d at 414). 
9. See id. 
10. See id. 
11. Id. at 320. 
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showed that the employment contract with the employee was based on 
the employee's fraudulent misrepresentations. 
The Tenth Circuit in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automotive In-
surance Co., 12 held that after-acquired evidence constituted a legitimate 
reason to fire an employee. 13 The court, relying on Mt. Healthy City 
School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 14 determined that it was 
appropriate for courts "to 'make [an] after-the-fact rationale' regarding 
the circumstances that would have existed absent the discriminatory 
conduct. " 15 The court allowed retroactive application of newly discov-
ered information to justify the employee's discharge. Thus, unlike the 
Sixth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit did not require the employer to rely on 
the employee's misrepresentation when it hired the employee. 16 
The Seventh Circuit's application of after-acquired evidence is 
more strict than the Sixth Circuit's. The Seventh Circuit allows the evi-
dence to totally extinguish the employee's claim if the employer can 
prove that the employee would have been terminated had the employer 
known about the misconduct. 17 The court refused to assume that an em-
ployer would terminate all employees who had made material misrepre-
sentations on their resumes or conducted themselves in an adverse 
manner. In order to use the after-acquired evidence as a defense, the 
employer is required to state that such misrepresentation or misconduct 
by the employees was not tolerated, and that the employers would have 
fired anyone who acted in such a manner. 18 
In addition to the after-acquired evidence rule, the Eleventh Circuit 
also addressed the issue of appropriate damage calculation. It reasoned 
that "where after-acquired evidence provides the employer with a le-
gitimate reason to fire the employee, reinstatement, front-pay, and in-
junctive relief are unavailable, but back-pay, attorney's fees, and nomi-
nal damages remain available. " 19 The court chose to allow employees to 
pursue backpay because it thought that otherwise employers would "de-
vote less resources to preventing discrimination" because the employers 
12. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10m Cir. 1988). 
13. See id. The case involved an insurance claims representative who sued on the basis of 
age and religious discrimination but the court extinguished his claims when after-acquired evidence 
showed that he had filed 150 false claims. 
14. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
15. Massey, 828 F.Supp. at 319. (citing Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 
614, 623 (4'h Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984)). 
16. See id. at 319. 
17. See id. at 320. 
18. /d. 
19. Massey, 828 F.Supp. at 321 (discussing Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 
1184 (II m Cir.1992)). 
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could escape liability by investigating the employee's background?0 
The court believed that even though the after-acquired evidence justi-
fied the termination of an employee, "courts must strike a balance be-
tween preserving the employer's lawful prerogatives to fire employees 
and the statutory requirement to make persons whole for injuries suf-
fered from illegal employment decisions. "21 
The lack of continuity between circuits prevented the establishment 
of uniform rules on which employers and employees could rely. To 
remedy this lack of uniformity between the circuits the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. 
B. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. 
Christine McKennon, a 62-year-old woman, was employed as a 
secretary at Nashville Banner Publishing Company for 30 years before 
she was discharged. Nashville Banner claimed its work force reduction 
plan for financial restructuring was the reason McKennon's employ-
ment was terminated.ZZ However, McKennon believed that her age was 
the real reason behind Nashville Banner's decision to discharge her. 23 
She filed suit, 24 alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA). 25 
After-acquired evidence surfaced during McKennon's deposition. 
McKennon admitted that she had stolen financial records from the 
comptroller's office during the final year she worked at Nashville Ban-
ner. 26 She explained that her sole motive for acquiring the confidential 
financial records was to have some "insurance" and "protection" be-
cause she anticipated her wrongful termination. 27 Shortly after these 
statements were recorded in the deposition, McKennon received a cor-
respondence from Nashville Banner stating that they were terminating 
her employment because her actions were in direct conflict with her 
20. See Massey, 828 F.Supp. at 321 (discussing Wallace, 968 F.2d 1174). Wallace v. Dunn 
Constr. Co. was based on a claim of sexual discrimination under Title VII. Thus, the court may 
have been trying to effectuate the purpose of the law in passing down this particular decision. 
21. Massey, 828 F.Supp. at 321. 
22. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 354 (1995). 
23. See id. 
24. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 354. The basis for her claim comes from the fact that the 
"ADEA makes it unlawful for any employer: 'to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's age."' !d. at 355 (quoting the language of Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et. seq. (1988 and Supp. V)). 
25. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et. seq. (1988 and 
Supp. V). 
26. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 355. 
27. See id. 
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duties with the organization. Nashville Banner also stated that it would 
have promptly terminated McKennon at an earlier date if it had known 
of her grievous misconduct. 28 The company then filed for summary 
judgment based on the after-acquired evidence. 29 
The district court granted the summary judgment request holding 
that Nashville Banner had the right to terminate McKennon because of 
her misconduct. 30 The court also barred McKennon from recovering 
"back pay [or] any other remedy ... available to her under the 
ADEA. " 31 McKennon appealed but the Sixth Circuit upheld the deci-
sion. 32 McKennon appealed this decision and was granted certiorari by 
the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted the writ because it 
wanted to "resolve conflicting views among the Courts of Appeals on 
the question whether all relief must be denied when an employee has 
been discharged in violation of the ADEA and the employer later dis-
covers some wrongful conduct that would have led to discharge if it had 
been discovered earlier. "33 
The Supreme Court was not comfortable with the lower court's 
conclusion that after-acquired evidence could completely extinguish the 
employee's ability to recover anything under the ADEA. 34 The Court 
refused to ignore the fact that the employer violated federal law and 
discriminated against an employee by terminating the employee on the 
sole basis of age. 35 However, the Court did not want to limit its analysis 
of the effect of after-acquired evidence to violations of the ADEA. It 
recognized that the "ADEA is but part of a wider statutory scheme to 
protect employees in the workplace nationwide. "36 Quoting Oscar 
Mayer & Co. v. Evans, the Court stated that ADEA and Title VII share 
a common goal in that they both seek to achieve "the elimination of 
discrimination in the workplace. "37 The Court observed that these stat-
utes achieve their goals through deterrence and compensation. Thus, 
the Court concluded that "[i]t would not accord with this scheme if af-
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. Id. 
32. See id. at 356. 
33. Jd. 
34. See id. 
35. See id. 
36. /d. at 357. The court referred to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e et. seq. (1988 and Supp. V); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 
12101 et. seq. (1988 Supp. V); the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a); the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). 
37. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358 (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 
(1979)). 
108 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 14 
ter-acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have resulted in termi-
nation operates . . . to bar all relief for an earlier violation of the 
Act. "38 However, the Court struggled because it could not ignore the 
after-acquired evidence for fear of absolving the employees of their 
misconduct. 
First the Court considered the theory of unclean hands: 
Equity's maxim that a suitor who engaged in his own reprehensible 
conduct in the course of the transaction at issue must be denied equi-
table relief because of unclean hands, a rule which in conventional 
formulation operated in limine to bar the suitor from invoking the aid 
of the equity court. 39 
The Court deemed the theory of unclean hands inappropriate for situa-
tions in which the "private suit serves important public purposes. "40 
Thus, in such situations the Court considered that one person's miscon-
duct should not stand in the way of developing case law that would 
benefit society. 41 
The Court finally held that deference had to be given to the ADEA, 
and that after-acquired evidence should be considered, "not to punish 
the employee, "42 but to allow the employer to prosecute a claim to 
which it is entitled. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that 
"[a]n absolute rule barring any recovery of backpay ... would under-
mine the ADEA's objective of forcing employers to consider and ex-
amine their motivations. "43 The Court also provided a framework by 
which lower courts may calculate the appropriate amount of backpay by 
calculating the amount accrued from the time of the wrongful termina-
tion to the time the after-acquired evidence was discovered. 44 
McKennon set an important precedent for handling after-acquired 
evidence. It resurrected some remedies for employees and prohibited 
the use of after-acquired evidence in situtations where public policy 
concerns were present. McKennon, however, did not address the appli-
cation of the after-acquired evidence in situations where no public pol-
icy conerns were involved. McKennon was also unclear whether the 
doctrine of unclean hands applies to situations in which there is only a 
private individual and the employer. The Colorado Supreme Court, in 
38. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358. 
39. /d. at 360. 
40. /d. (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. lnt'l Parts Corp., 342 U.S. 134, 138 (1968)). 
41. See id. 
42. /d. at 362. 
43. /d. 
44. See id. 
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Crawford Rehabilitation Services Inc. v. Weissman, took it upon itself 
to answer these questions. 45 
III. CRAWFORD REHABILITATION SERVICES, INC. V. WEISSMAN 
A. Facts 
Crawford Rehabilitation Services, Inc. employed Susan Weissman 
as a clerical typist from 1988 to 1990. Susan Weissman argued with 
Leonard Francois, her manager at Crawford, regarding the number of 
breaks that an employee is entitled to take during day. After the argu-
ment, Weissman telephoned the Department of Labor to inquire about 
her rights to breaks at work. Weissman continued to take her rest 
breaks after being informed that Crawford could not prohibit her 
breaks. Subsequently, on January 25, 1990, Weissman asked her supe-
riors if she could take the following Monday off work. When she was 
told that she could not take the day off, Weissman informed her super-
visor that she would not show up for work on Monday. 46 On Friday, 
January 26, 1990, Weissman took the day off without permission. She 
also did not show up for work on the subsequent two days. Following 
her absence on January 30th, Crawford terminated Weissman's em-
ployment. 47 
After her termination, Weissman brought a cause of action claiming 
breach of implied contract, promissory estoppel, outrageous conduct, 
and wrongful discharge, seeking punitive and compensatory damages. 48 
The claim for wrongful discharge stemmed from the argument between 
Weissman and Francois. Weissman claimed that Crawford was angered 
by the fact that she placed the telephone call to the Department of La-
bor, and this was the main reason for firing her. 49 
Unlike McKennon, the evidence in Weissman concerned misrepre-
sentations made by Weissman on her application for employment rather 
than misconduct on the job.50 As in McKennon, the after-acquired evi-
dence surfaced during the deposition of the plaintiff. 51 The deposition 
revealed that Weissman had failed to state on her application that she 
was discharged from the Association of Operating Room Nurses 
45. Crawford Rehabilitation Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540 (1997). 
46. See id. at 543. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. 
49. See id. 
50. See id. 
51. See id. at 543-44. 
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(AORN), that she did not actually work full-time at Kirk Advertising 
but on a part-time basis, and that she previously sued an employer over 
an allegedly wrongful termination. 52 When trying to explain her dis-
crepancies, Weissman stated that she did not "list AORN as a previous 
employer because she believed she was prohibited from doing so by the 
terms of a release she signed .... "53 However, she used the same rea-
soning to justify her erroneous statement that she worked at Kirk Ad-
vertising full-time when, in fact, she only worked on a part-time ba-
sis. 54 
After discovering these misstatements, Crawford filed a motion to 
dismiss the case due to the newly discovered evidence uncovered in the 
deposition. The court held that Weissman's fraudulent statements 
voided any existing employment contract between Crawford and 
Weissman. 55 The trial court granted Crawford's motion to dismiss the 
"claims for breach of implied contract and promissory estoppel on the 
theories of unclean hands, fraud in the inducement, and the after-
acquired evidence doctrine ... [and] that the after-acquired evidence 
doctrine precluded the claim for wrongful discharge. "56 The court also 
dismissed the claim of outrageous conduct because Weissman failed to 
properly state a basis for relief. 57 Weissman appealed and the court of 
appeals granted a review. 58 The court of appeals sustained dismissal of 
the claim of outrageous conduct but reversed on the issue of wrongful 
discharge. The court of appeals relied on McKennon's decision, which 
stated that an employee's rights to backpay could not be extinguished 
by newly discovered evidence of the employee's misconduct. 59 The 
court of appeals remanded the claim of breach of implied contract and 
promissory estoppel, stating that Weissman's situation was not one that 
constituted a public concern. 60 
52. See id. at 544. 
53. /d. at 545. 
54. See id. 
55. See id. 
56. !d. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. at 546. 
60. The court stated that since there were no public concerns the claims could be eliminated 
under the idea of "resume fraud if: (1) the misstatement or omission related to a material fact; (2) 
it related directly to the evaluation of the application; and (3) it was reasonably relied upon by 
Crawford in hiring Weissman." !d. 
103] AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE 111 
B. The Colorado Supreme Court's Holding 
The Colorado Supreme Court granted review. In its analysis of the 
claims for breach of implied contract and promissory estoppel, the 
court relied on case law that discussed the after-acquired evidence doc-
trine and "[b]asic principles of law and equity .... "61 In its examina-
tion of Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 62 the court held 
that newly discovered evidence that shows an employee in an unfavor-
able light can be used by employers to protect themselves from liability 
and to limit relief. 63 The court reasoned that "an employee cannot com-
plain about being wrongfully discharged because the individual is no 
worse off than she would have been had the truth of her misconduct 
been presented at the outset. "64 In other words, the employee never had 
a legally binding contract with the employer because the employment 
relationship was formed under the influence of the employee's mis-
statements. The court also applied a rule based on contract theory that 
allows a party who has been fraudulently induced into entering a con-
tract to break the contract and "restore the status quo." The court rea-
soned that this rule also applies in situations where the employee mis-
conduct was not discovered until after the wrongful termination. 65 
The court used the doctrine of unclean hands to examine the use of 
after-acquired evidence. The doctrine of unclean hands is based on ba-
sic principles of equity which state that "he who seeks equity should do 
equity and come with clean hands. "66 Thus, persons seeking an equita-
ble remedy must not have engaged in any misconduct. Therefore, em-
ployees who either made material misstatements in their resume or en-
gaged in misconduct on the job should not be able to recover from their 
employers because employees are not entirely innocent. As to the claim 
of wrongful discharge, the court held that Wiessman did not state a 
"cognizable cause of action" that would allow her to recover any reme-
dies. 67 
61. See id. 
62. 35 Cal. App. 4th 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
63. See id. This case was about a husband and wife who were fired from a law firm. It was 
later discovered that the wife had illegally taken some documents. 
64. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 547 (quoting Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan 
Soc'y, 921 P.2d 224, 226 (1996), aff'd (Kan. 1997)). 
65. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 548. (using the analysis in Bassi v. Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. which stated that "after-acquired evidence may completely bar a claim for breach of the 
employment contract because the employer's duty arises from the contract itself and falls with that 
contract." Bassi v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 808 F.Supp. 1306, 1309 (E.D.Mich. 
1992)). 
66. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 548 (quoting Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595 
(Colo. 1951)). 
67. !d. at 551. 
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The court stated that the only exceptions to the at-will employment 
law in Colorado are public policy and implied contract exceptions. The 
public policy exception protects an employee from termination by the 
employer for refusing to participate in illegal activities. 68 In Martin Ma-
rietta Corp. v. Lorenz,69 the Colorado Supreme Court held that in order 
to present a prima facie case for wrongful discharge, an employee must 
show: 
[T]hat the employer directed the employee to perform an illegal act as 
part of the employee's work related duties or prohibited the employee 
from performing a public duty or exercising an important job-related 
right or privilege; that the action directed by the employer would 
violate a specific statute relating to the public health, safety, or wel-
fare, or would undermine a clearly expressed public policy relating to 
the employee's basic responsibility as a citizen or the employee's right 
or privilege as a worker; and that the employee was terminated as the 
result of refusing to perform the act directed by the employer. 70 
The court also held that the public policy exception only applies 
when the issue at hand "affects society at large rather than a purely per-
sonal or propriety interest of the plaintiff or employer . . . [and] lead to 
an outrageous result clearly inconsistent with a stated public policy ... 
or 'strike[s] at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and respon-
sibilities. "' 71 Applying these guidelines, the court held that neither 
Weissman's right to contact the Department of Labor nor her right to 
take breaks rose to the level of a public policy concern.72 In determin-
ing this, the court cautioned that the development of case law for the 
public policy exceptions should be done carefully. It stated that an issue 
must be thoroughly examined before it be considered a public policy 
concern. 73 The court did not elaborate on whether the use of "after-
acquired evidence of resume fraud would completely preclude an em-
ployee's action for retaliatory firing in violation of public policy or 
whether McKennon would operate to limit the application of the after-
acquired evidence rule. "74 
68. See id. 
69. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992). 
70. /d. at 109. 
71. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 552 (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 
N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981) (citations omitted)). 
72. See id. 
73. See id. at 553. 
74. /d. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
A. Background of the Public Policy Exception 
Courts have never been able to clearly answer the question of what 
constitutes a public policy matter in employer-employee relationships. 
The conflict arises out of the "difficulty ... in determining where and 
how to draw the line between claims that genuinely involve matters of 
public policy, and those that concern merely ordinary disputes between 
employer and employee. "75 Courts have distinguished public policy 
matters from private matters by specifying that public policy matters 
affect society at large rather than any of the individual or proprietary 
interests of the plaintiff, and that the "policy must be 'fundamental,' 
'substantial' and 'well established' at the time of the discharge. "76 
Courts have generally found that clear public policy violations arise in 
four employment situations. 77 
The first situation occurs when an employee refuses to perform 
certain illegal acts and is terminated as a result. 78 Petermann v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters79 is a prime example of this situa-
tion. The teamsters hired Petermann as a business agent, but fired him 
when he refused to commit perjury. The court, though recognizing the 
importance of an at-will employment relationship, refused to allow 
Teamsters to terminate Petermann because he would not commit per-
jury.80 The court reasoned that it would be contrary to the state's inter-
ests and public policy to allow an employer to terminate an employee 
for refusing to commit an illegal act. 81 The court concluded that to pre-
serve the integrity of state law, "the civil law ... must deny the em-
ployer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose 
employment is for an unspecified duration .... "82 In essence, the 
court found that to allow terminations predicated on the failure of an 
employee to commit an illegal act under state law would promote the 
very behavior that the state wishes to restrict. 
The second public policy violation in the employment relationship 
occurs when the employer acts in a manner that prevents the employee 
75. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 683 (Cal. 1992). 
76. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1998). 
77. See Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d at 683. 
78. Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
79. /d. 
80. See id. at 27. 
81. See id. 
82. /d. 
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from performing the employee's legal responsibilities. These cases in-
volve statutes that courts consider as important American institutions; 
statutes that confer important obligations onto the citizens. 83 The court 
in Nees v. Hocks84 held that jury duty was a statutory obligation that 
should be protected from employer interference. The court, using a 
balancing test that weighed the community interest in having jury duty 
with an employer's rights to terminate an employee, concluded that the 
government's extensive steps to guarantee jury trials demonstrates the 
importance of allowing citizens to serve on juries. 85 The court con-
cluded that allowing employers to sanction employees in order to dis-
suade the employees from performing their legal obligations would 
contradict the purpose of the law. 86 
The third situation courts have declared a public policy violation 
occurs when an employer prevents an employee from exercising a 
statutory right or privilege. In Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Asso-
ciation, 87 the court found that an employer who terminated employees 
because of their involvement in union activities violated public policy. 88 
The court went even further, creating a cause of action for employees 
where their employers had prevented them from exercising their rights 
and privileges. 89 
The final public policy exception applies to an employee who re-
ports an employer's illegal activity. Hentzel v. Singer Co.CXJ dealt with 
such a situation. In Hentzel, the court reasoned that allowing employees 
to report illegal actions performed by employers is beneficial to em-
ployers because it increases employee morale.91 Moreover, allowing 
this type of system forces the employer to obey the law, thus benefiting 
society as a whole. 92 
The four situations where courts find public policy violations in the 
employment relationship all involve statutory violations. Some courts, 
however, have found that besides legislation, "administrative rules, 
regulations or decision[ s] and judicial decisions" are sources from 
which public policy can be derived and then used to limit the at-will 
83. See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975). 
84. See id. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. 
87. Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Ass'n., 79 Cai.Rptr. 543, 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1969). 
88. See id. at 547. 
89. See id. at 548. 
90. Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). 
91. See id. at 164. 
92. See id. 
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employment relationship. 93 This broad view of the public policy excep-
tion is best articulated in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. ,94 in 
which the Illinois Supreme Court wrote that "[i]n general, it can be said 
that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the 
citizens of the State collectively. Public policy is to be found in the 
State's constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial 
decisions. "95 Some courts, not wanting to confine public policy though 
wary of giving courts free rein, have only marginally expanded the 
public policy exception to include clear legislative mandates or judicial 
decisions. 96 
Though these differing views of public policy add to its amorphous 
nature, there are a few shared themes. First, courts agree that a public 
policy exception should not be applied in cases that only concern an in-
dividual right and do not affect society as a whole. This is difficult be-
cause the analysis of the individual is usually intertwined with the 
analysis of the group. Second, when an employee is terminated for rea-
sons contrary to the purpose of a statute, it is appropriate to perform a 
public policy analysis. Third, courts have to be cautious in granting a 
public policy exception. The public policy exception is "notoriously re-
sistant to precise definition, and that courts should venture into this 
area, if at all, with great care and due deference to the judgment of the 
legislative branch, 'lest they mistake their own predilections for public 
policy which deserves recognition at law.' "97 Thus, courts should care-
fully scrutinize every claim based on public policy arguments. 
B. How Erring on the Side of Caution Led to Inconsistent Case Law 
The court in Weissman98 based its decision on previously con-
structed criteria that an employee must prove that "the action[s] di-
rected by the employer would violate a specific statute relating to the 
public health, safety, or welfare, or would undermine a clearly ex-
pressed public policy relating to the employee's rights as a worker. "99 
The court found for Crawford Rehabilitation because it determined that 
Weissman was not able to show that there was any "clearly expressed 
93. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980). 
94. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E. 2d 876 (Ill. 1981). 
95. /d. at 878. 
96. See Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 593 (Minn Ct. App. 
1986). 
97. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d at 687 (quoting Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. 
1992)) See also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hasp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1034 (Ariz. 1985). 
98. Weissman, 938 P.2d at 552. 
99. /d. at 553 (quoting Rocky Mountain Hasp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 
524 (Colo. 1996) (citing Martin Marietta Corp. v Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992)). 
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public policy relating to an employee's basic rights or duties." 100 The 
court was not able to discern any clearly expressed public policy be-
cause it was too anxious to follow other courts. The court failed to see 
that Weissman's claims would pass both the strict statutorily-based 
public policy exception requirements and the broad public policy re-
quirements that have been laid out by other courts. 
The court's failure to acknowledge Weissman's public policy argu-
ments is especially apparent when it held that no public policy concern 
was implicated when an employee was terminated for inquiring about 
her rights in the workplace. 101 The court failed to implement the proper 
public policy analysis in coming to its decision. This issue was not just 
a private matter between Weissman and Crawford, but a public matter 
that concerned the general relationship between employers and employ-
ees. This public policy concern is evidenced by legislative purpose as 
well as general notions of public welfare. 
C. The Public Policy Reasoning for Employee Inquiries 
The court erred when it decided that Weissman's claim for wrong-
ful discharge was not based on public policy concerns. The wrongful 
discharge claims were based on Weissman's allegations that she was 
fired because she contacted the Department of Labor to inquire about 
her right to take rest breaks. 102 Instead of focusing its public policy 
analysis on Weissman's rights to rest breaks, the court should have fo-
cused its analysis on Weissman's right to inquire about her rights. 103 
The real issue was whether it was acceptable for employers to terminate 
employees for securing information about employees' rights at work. 
Analyzed under this light, the cause of action would pass both the nar-
row legislation-based public policy test and the less constrained test of 
public policy. 
The freedom of an employee to inquire about workplace rights 
passes the public policy test because it falls under one of the four situa-
tions in which courts have generally found a public policy violation. 
Crawford's termination of Weissman for inquiring about her rights 
violates the rule that an employer cannot prevent an employee from ex-
ercising a statutory right or privilege. Although legislation specifically 
prohibiting employers from terminating employees for inquiring about 
their rights does not exist, it is implied in most employee rights legisla-
100. See Weissman, 938 P.2d at 553. 
101. /d. at 541. 
102. See id. at 543. 
103. See id. at 551. 
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tion. It would be illogical to construct laws that protect employees and 
then allow employers to restrict employee access to these laws. 
If an employer is allowed to terminate an employee for inquiring 
about workplace rights, then an employer can, in effect, bypass its legal 
obligations. The employer could keep working conditions below legal 
standards and the risk of being terminated would deter employees from 
inquiring about their rights. Employers would also have incentives to 
terminate those employees who know their rights. Thus, legislation de-
signed to protect employees from poor working conditions would be 
frustrated. The court's analysis in Weissman is faulty because Weiss-
man's cause of action was based not on her right to take breaks, but on 
her right to ask about her rights at work. The court erroneously deter-
mined that the main issue in Weissman was a private matter and not of 
public concern. 
Since this issue centers on the ability of all employees to inquire 
about their employment rights and not just on Weissman's individual 
rights, the issue lies in the public policy sphere. As previously dis-
cussed, not only does this decision create incentives for employers to 
terminate employees for inquiring about their rights, it encourages the 
termination of employees who uncover deficiencies in the workplace. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The use of after-acquired evidence in employment situations has 
developed in a slow, confusing manner. The McKennon decision clari-
fied much of this confusion and established firm rules for the use of af-
ter-acquired evidence. However, as seen in Weissman, the application 
of these ideas remains difficult. This difficulty comes from the reluc-
tance of courts to determine which employment situations rise to the 
public policy level. The court in Weissman erroneously ignored the 
rules formulated in McKennon, stating that the claims of the plaintiff 
were not a matter of public policy. The court in Weissman should have 
viewed the situation as involving a public policy concern because the 
situation fell into one of the four instances where courts typically find a 
public policy issue in the employment relationship. This also shows that 
a rule on how to identify a public policy matter in relation to employ-
ment situations must be established in order for the McKennon rule to 
be applied effectively. 
Weissman is a prime example of how courts can still complicate the 
after-acquired evidence issue by not correctly categorizing a claim as a 
public policy matter. The court was overly cautious in its application of 
the rule and failed to broaden its focus. It failed to consider the broad 
effects of its ruling on the employment relationship in Colorado. In 
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finding that an employee, who entered into the employment relationship 
under false pretenses, has no cause of action when an employer does 
not follow termination procedures in an employee manual, the court ab-
solves employers of their bad acts. This is contrary to Weissman's con-
clusion that an employer should not be allowed to get away with dis-
charging an employee in a manner that the public would not tolerate. 
The Court's decision also ran contrary to McKennon's findings when it 
decided that employees inquiring about their rights at work is not a 
matter of public policy. The decision allows employers to get away 
with keeping their workforce ignorant as to their rights, thus possibly 
creating dangerous working conditions. The court also contradicted it-
self when it failed to see that an employee may be granted a cause of 
action based on statements made by an employer in an employee man-
ual. 
The court in Weissman did not answer the questions left in the wake 
of McKennon because it failed to properly apply the public policy 
analysis. The findings in Weissman run contrary to McKennon's ideas 
of punishing the employer even though the employee was also at fault. 
This should serve as an illustration of the inconsistent case law in after-
acquired evidence that still exists after McKennon. 
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